Nuclear Brink

On June 13, 2025, the long-standing political tension between Israel and Iran rapidly erupted into open military confrontation. Israel launched an operation targeting Iran’s nuclear and military facilities with airstrikes, killing senior military officials and scientists and disabling air defense systems. In retaliation, Iran launched a massive barrage of rockets at Israel, striking military bases and cities—including Tel Aviv—causing casualties and widespread destruction.Two days later, the conflict escalated further. Iranian missiles began hitting civilian infrastructure in Israel, killing civilians, including children, and injuring hundreds. Israel, in turn, declared it was systematically dismantling Iran’s military capabilities.The conflict triggered a sharp spike in oil prices and stoked fears of global escalation. The Israeli prime minister affirmed the government’s commitment to continue the operation until Iran’s nuclear threat was fully eliminated. Meanwhile, analysts warned of the growing risk of U.S. involvement and the potential for the conflict to spiral into a far wider war.

These developments have reignited a critical question: Does Iran already possess nuclear weapons—and if not, how likely is it to acquire them soon?

Western governments believe that Iran now has nearly all the components required to quickly build a nuclear bomb, though there is no conclusive evidence that Tehran has made the political decision to do so. Israel, justifying its strikes on Iran’s military-industrial complex, declared that its official goal is to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program, which it sees as a direct threat to its security. On Friday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated: “This could happen within a year—or even within a few months,” referring to Iran’s progress toward building an atomic bomb. However, Israel has yet to provide substantive public evidence supporting these claims.Israeli military and intelligence officials have cited what they describe as “concrete progress” by Tehran in producing components for a nuclear weapon. One example includes claims that Iran has developed neutron initiators—devices that emit a burst of neutrons to trigger a chain reaction in a nuclear reactor or bomb. This narrative, however, contrasts with the stance of Israel’s closest ally—the United States. On March 25 of this year, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard testified that Iran is not currently engaged in active nuclear weapons development.

“The intelligence community still assesses that Iran is not pursuing nuclear weapons and that Supreme Leader Khamenei has not authorized a program to develop a nuclear weapon, which he halted in 2003,” she told the Senate Intelligence Committee. Gabbard also referenced a fatwa issued by Khamenei declaring the use of nuclear weapons forbidden under Islam—an edict that forms the basis of Iran’s nuclear doctrine.

Nevertheless, Western countries continue to suspect that Iran may accelerate its pursuit of a nuclear bomb, citing the country’s unprecedented stockpile of highly enriched uranium. For use in nuclear power plants, uranium must be enriched to only 5%. Once the concentration exceeds 20%, the material becomes suitable primarily for submarine propulsion or research reactors. Iran is now enriching uranium to 60%—close to the 90% threshold required for a nuclear weapon. According to the most recent quarterly report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) dated May 31, Iran possesses more than 408 kilograms of 60%-enriched uranium—enough to produce approximately nine nuclear warheads if enriched to weapons-grade. In February, that figure stood at 274 kilograms.According to the IAEA report, although uranium enrichment under agency oversight is not prohibited, Iran’s stockpile of such material is cause for serious concern—particularly because it is the only non-nuclear-armed state producing and stockpiling uranium enriched to 60%.

However, the report does not claim that Iran is close to building a nuclear bomb, nor does it provide evidence of a covert nuclear weapons program. Instead, it criticizes Tehran for insufficient cooperation with inspectors.

Luciano Zaccara, a professor at the Gulf Studies Center of Qatar University, argues that neither the IAEA report nor the Board of Governors' resolution justifies Israel’s military action. He notes that the document's contents differ little from assessments made over the past 20 years: inspectors have detected radioactive traces at certain sites, but Iran has failed to explain their origin. This criticism remains consistent—but it does not amount to proof of a military nuclear program.Iran’s interest in nuclear weapons predates the Islamic Revolution. Under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, a U.S. ally, Iran launched its first nuclear program. In 2015, Tehran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, Germany, and the European Union, agreeing to sharply curb its nuclear ambitions and eliminate 97% of its enriched uranium stockpile.Iran pledged not to enrich uranium above 3.75% and to store no more than 200 kilograms of the material, all while accepting rigorous international inspections in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. In 2018, despite Iran’s substantial compliance, President Donald Trump—encouraged by Israel—withdrew the United States from the agreement unilaterally. Washington reimposed sanctions, prompting Tehran to abandon the deal’s limits and begin exceeding enrichment thresholds.In 2021, Iran began enriching uranium to 60% at the Natanz nuclear facility—now one of the primary targets of Israel’s recent attacks.In April 2025, IAEA Director Rafael Grossi stated that former senior Iranian officials had acknowledged the country’s full capability to rapidly develop a nuclear weapon. He also noted that Iran possesses a wide arsenal of ballistic missiles theoretically capable of carrying nuclear warheads. However, weaponization requires more than just producing a bomb—it also involves miniaturizing it to fit atop a missile. When asked how long it would take Iran to develop such a warhead, Grossi replied: “Timelines are always fluid. But it’s a matter of months, not years.”

The current situation around Iran closely echoes moments in recent history—when allegations of weapons of mass destruction served as a pretext for military intervention.

This refers to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. At the time, the administration of President George W. Bush claimed that Saddam Hussein was developing and hiding chemical and biological weapons and was attempting to revive a nuclear weapons program. These assertions were used to justify military intervention—but after the occupation, no weapons of mass destruction were ever found.The paradox now is that Israel’s attack may have the opposite effect: instead of halting Iran’s ambitions, it could convince Tehran that becoming a nuclear power is the only way to ensure its security. For comparison, Israel is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons, although it has never officially acknowledged this.Trita Parsi, vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, remarked that “nothing strengthens a country’s desire for nuclear deterrence like an actual attack.” He warned that Israel’s strike could backfire—cementing Iran’s resolve to pursue nuclear weapons rather than deterring it.In her public remarks, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard has repeatedly emphasized that the long-standing taboo around openly discussing nuclear weapons in Iran is steadily eroding. This shift, she warned, could bolster the influence of those within the Iranian leadership who support the development of a nuclear bomb.In October 2024, thirty-nine ultra-conservative members of parliament sent a letter to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council urging a revision of the country’s nuclear doctrine. One of the letter’s authors, MP Hassan Ali Akhlaghi Amiri, argued that nuclear weapons were necessary to deter Israel, which, in his view, is not held accountable by any international body—not even by European nations or the United States.

Thus, the military escalation between Israel and Iran has created a dangerous feedback loop: efforts to prevent the emergence of a new nuclear state may end up accelerating precisely that outcome.

Israel’s push to neutralize Iran’s nuclear program through military means is, paradoxically, accelerating the very process that diplomatic efforts were meant to prevent.Recent developments have revealed a profound shift within Iranian society and its political elite: from a longstanding rejection of nuclear weapons to increasingly open discussion of them as a necessary component of national security. The breakdown of long-held taboos and growing calls by lawmakers to revisit Iran’s nuclear doctrine suggest that external pressure is fundamentally reshaping the internal dynamics of a country that, until now, had refrained from pursuing an atomic bomb for both religious and political reasons.The irony is stark: the region’s sole nuclear power, in seeking to preserve its monopoly on atomic deterrence, may inadvertently provoke the emergence of a rival. History shows that it is often the perception of an existential threat that compels nations to pursue nuclear weapons. In this light, Israel’s strikes on Iranian facilities may not serve as a deterrent but rather as a catalyst for Tehran’s nuclear ambitions—transforming a potential threat into a looming reality.